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Abstract:	This	article	assesses	the	relationship	between	democracy	and	welfare	policy.	There	
are	substantial	variations	in	the	empirical	evidence	regarding	the	relationship	between	these	
two	 variables.	 While	 some	 works	 showed	 that	 there	 is	 a	 systematic	 relationship	 between	
democracy	and	welfare	policy,	others	failed	to	show	that	relationship.	We	argue	that	we	need	
to	 look	 at	 the	 internal	 political	 variables	 within	 these	 democracies	 in	 order	 to	 see	 what	
factors	within	those	polities	that	can	lead	to	a	more	welfare-oriented	policy.	We	further	argue	
that	democracies	with	parliamentary	system	and	proportional	representation	are	more	likely	
to	adopt	welfare-oriented	policy.	Using	panel	data	of	32	democracies	from	1961	to	2015,	we	
find	some	empirical	supports	for	our	argument.		
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Introduction		Liberalism	 departs	 from	 an	understanding	 that	 human	 beings	 are	creatures	that	are	always	in	progress	and	struggle	 towards	 goodness	 /	 perfection.	Liberals	 believe	 that	 cooperation	 will	allow	humans	to	achieve	better	results.	A	person	must	be	able	to	look	at	a	problem	by	 considering	 mutual	 interests.	 As	explained	 by	 Burchill,	 Liberalism	 “has	
championed	 limited	 government	 and	
scientific	 rationality,	 believing	 individuals	
should	 be	 free	 from	 arbitrary	 state,	
persecution	 and	 superstition.	 It	 has	
advocated	 political	 freedom,	 democracy	
and	constitutionally	guaranteed	rights	and	
privileged	 the	 liberty	 of	 individual	 and	
equality	 before	 the	 law.”	 (Scott	 Burchill,	1992).	 In	 this	 case,	 liberals	 consider	 that	in	 society,	 government’s	 role	 must	 be	minimized	 and	 individual	 freedom,	
democracy,	 and	 equality	 before	 the	 law	must	 be	 upheld.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	social	 realm,	 the	 country	 chooses	 moral	and	 ethics	 and	 cosmopolitan	 law	 as	 the	basis	 for	 social	 interaction.	Internationally,	 state	 chooses	international	 institution	 as	 a	 medium	 to	share	goodness.	In	 the	 Post	 World	 War	 II,	liberalism	 has	 been	 a	 popular	 paradigm.	This	 is	 indicated	 by	 the	 growth	 of	democracies.	 Democracies	 are	increasingly	 preferred	 because	 they	 are	presumably	welfare-oriented.	 The	 liberal	basic	argument	regarding	democracy	and	welfare	 is	 that	 democracy	 will	 bring	prosperity	 because	 democracy	 allows	public	 access	 toward	 government	policies.	In	addition,	people	also	have	the	ability	 to	 control	 the	 policy	makers.	 This	is	different	from	the	authoritarian	system	
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which	 does	 not	 open	 a	 genuine	representative	mechanism	 for	 its	 people.	The	 argument	 on	 the	 relationship	between	 democracy	 and	 welfare	 is	 then	articulated	in	the	idea	of	free	markets.	As	a	 form	of	economic	democratization,	 free	market	 gives	 economic	 actors	 the	opportunity	 to	 produce	 economic	resources	 that	 have	 benefits	 for	 all.	 The	free	market	will	bring	prosperity	just	like	David	 Ricardo's	 and	 Adam	 Smith's	arguments	about	invisible	hands.	But	the	fact	is	that	it	is	not	always	the	case,	democracy	is	not	always	related	to	the	economic	welfare	of	a	country.	The	fact	 is	 that	 some	 democracies	 still	 have	large	 poverty	 such	 as	 India	 and	 parts	 of	Latin	 America	 and	 Africa.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 absolute	 Monarchical	 countries	such	 as	 Brunei	 Darussalam	 in	 ASEAN,	Saudi	Arabia	in	the	Middle	East	and	some	semi-authoritarian	 countries	 such	 as	Singapore	and	South	Korea	(until	the	late	1980s)	 showed	 a	 high	 level	 of	 welfare.		We	 argue	 that	 instead	 of	 a	 political	regime	 (democracy	 vs.	 non-democracy)	that	 results	 in	 welfare,	 it	 is	 the	 internal	mechanism	 in	 democracy	 that	 might	influence	 a	 country's	 preference	 for	welfare	orientation.	Before	 further	 observing	 the	empirical	data	 to	 test	 this	 conjecture,	we	will	 first	 elaborate	 literature	 on	 the	relationship	 between	 democracy	 and	welfare	 to	 show	 our	 intellectual	contribution	to	this	issue.	The	 purpose	 of	 democracy	 is	 to	provide	 welfare	 for	 its	 citizens.	 Long	debates	 that	 occur	 are	 still	 speculative,	because	 they	 depend	 on	 a	 number	 of	assumptions	and	statements	that	must	be	proven.	 Not	 only	 is	 the	 relationship	between	 democracy	 and	well-being	 non-
linear,	 it	 is	 also	 very	 complicated	involving	 many	 factors,	 such	 as	 history,	social	 structure,	 education,	 law	enforcement,	 flexibility	 and	 stability	 of	political	institutions	and	so	on.	Caoili	 (2005)	 argues	 that	 most	scholars	measure	democracy	using	citizen	participation,	 electoral	 competition	 and	civil	 liberties.	 Democracy	 and	development	 are	 thought	 to	 have	 a	symbiotic	 relationship	 where	 democracy	accompanied	 by	 market	 liberalization	provides	 the	 engine	 of	 a	 country's	economic	growth.	This	can	occur	because	the	 decentralization	 of	 political	 power	and	market	liberalization	is	considered	to	contribute	 to	 the	 trust,	 initiative,	investment	 and	 growth	 of	 producers	 as	market	 participants.	 However,	 domestic	stability	also	plays	an	important	role	as	a	conditioning	 variable	 that	 facilitates	 the	positive	 influence	 of	 capital	 on	 economic	growth.	 Political	 stability	 enables	economic	 activities	 to	 run	 smoothly	which	 eventually	 push	 economy	 to	develop	faster.	This	can	apply	everywhere	regardless	 of	 the	 type	 of	 political	 regime	of	 the	 country.	 However,	 compared	 to	authoritarian	 system,	 democracy	 is	considered	 to	 be	 able	 to	 resolve	 social	conflicts	 through	 non-violent	 political	solutions.	 This	 non-violence	 solution	 to	social	 conflict	 tends	 to	 result	 in	 longer	stability.	 And	 because	 social	 stability	 is	the	 precondition	 for	 economic	development,	democracy	 is	often	seen	as	the	 fertile	 ground	 for	 economic	prosperity.	 Thus,	 democracy	 indirectly	influences	 economic	 growth	 through	political	 stability	 which	 attracts	investment	(Caoili,	2005).	Political	 stability	 is	 an	 important	key	 in	 creating	 economic	 prosperity	 in	 a	
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country.	Political	stability	is	considered	to	provide	a	conducive	climate	for	economic	growth	such	as	increased	investment	and	other	 forms	 of	 economic	 activity.	 In	 this	case	the	democratic	system	is	considered	capable	 of	 creating	 more	 stable	 political	conditions	 due	 to	 active	 participation	 of	the	 community.	 In	 addition,	 with	 the	existence	 of	 democracy	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	conflict	 at	 the	 local	 level	 can	be	 resolved	properly.	Another	 dimension	 of	 democracy	that	contributes	to	economic	prosperity	is	economic	freedom,	especially	 in	the	form	of	 free	 markets.	 Free	 market	 forces	economic	 actors	 to	 work	 efficiently	 to	survive.	 This	 efficiency	 can	 lead	 to	prosperity	 because	 it	 allows	 for	 lower	cost	of	production,	hence	lower	price	and	higher	 output.	 This	 can	 subsequently	increase	 income.	 However,	 while	 free	market	 is	 often	 said	 as	 one	 source	 of	prosperity—which	 justifies	 the	relationship	 between	 democracy	 and	prosperity,	 this	 is	 not	 always	 the	 case.	Just	 take	 a	 look	 at	 some	 prosperous	authoritarian	 countries	 such	 as	Singapore,	 Malaysia	 under	 Mahathir	Muhammad	and	South	Korea	under	Park	Chung	 Hee	 and	 Chun	 Doo	 Hwan.	 Even	though	 they	 did	 not	 embrace	 democracy	and	 free	 market,	 they	 successfully	demonstrate	 that	 democracy	 is	 not	necessarily	 identical	 with	 prosperity.	Their	 success	 story	 reveals	 that	 rather	than	the	regime	type,	it	is	the	institutional	factors	 within	 the	 regime	 that	 might	shape	 the	 level	 of	 prosperity	 within	 a	country.	While	 many	 scholars	 investigate	the	 effect	 of	 regime	 type	 on	 the	 level	 of	prosperity,	 some	 other	 scholars	 explore	the	 other	 way	 around.	 One	 notable	
scholar	 doing	 this	 is	 economist	 Robert	Barro.	 Barro's	 analysis	 shows	 that	increasing	living	standards	-	measured	by	a	 country's	 real	 per	 capita	 GDP,	 infant	mortality	 rates,	 and	 the	 level	 of	participation	of	primary	and	male	schools	-	 will	 substantially	 lead	 to	 a	 more	democratic	institution	(Barro,	1996).	Another	 scholar	 such	 as	 Joseph	Siegle	 pointed	 out	 that	 countries	 that	have	 reached	 the	 threshold	 of	 middle	income	 and	 are	 successful	 in	 reducing	poverty	 and	 increasing	 the	 living	standards	 of	 the	people	will	 naturally	 be	inclined	 to	 be	 democratic.	 Openness	 is	 a	feature	 of	 democracy	 which	 can	 help	strengthening	 democracy.	 transparency	provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 increase	debate	 and	 policy	 analysis	 that	 is	 more	informative	 before	 government	 policy	 is	taken.	At	the	very	least,	such	a	process	is	expected	 to	 avoid	 the	 emergence	 of	policies	 that	 can	harm	society.	Thus,	 it	 is	hoped	 that	 the	 emerging	 policies	 will	receive	 support	 from	 the	 public	(Siegle,2016:7).		The	 abovementioned	 works	demonstrate	 unclear	 causal	 connection	between	 democracy	 and	 prosperity.	 The	works	suggest	that	the	declining	trend	in	infant	 mortality	 and	 the	 increasing	numbers	of	pupils	going	to	school	do	not	mean	that	 they	are	caused	by	democracy	per	 se.	 Instead,	 they	 could	 emerge	because	a	better	development	can	lead	to	an	improved	level	of	economic	prosperity	all	sectors	including	education,	health	and	so	on.	 However,	looking	at	some	cases	of	success	 story	 in	 both	 democracies	 and	authoritarian	 countries	 shows	 that	 both	regimes	 can	 lead	 to	 economic	 growth.	Dictatorships	 are	 more	 effective	 in	
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encouraging	 growth	 and	 investment	 by	suppressing	 trade	 unions,	 wages,	 and	consumer	 demand.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	democracy	 limits	 state	 discretion	 and	 is	thus	 more	 effective	 at	 stimulating	economic	growth	because	they	emphasize	credible	 commitments.	 In	 this	 case	 the	authorities	will	maintain	the	trust	of	their	voters	 to	 keep	 the	 agreed	 commitments	(Durham,	1999).			Thus,	 economic	 well-being	 is	 also	largely	 determined	 by	 the	 policies	 of	 the	authorities	 in	 both	 the	 authoritarian	 and	democratic	 systems.	 In	 this	 case	 the	authorities	 in	 both	 systems	 have	 a	commitment	 to	 economic	 welfare.	 In	 an	authoritarian	 system,	 policies	 taken	 by	the	 authorities	 to	 increase	 economic	growth	will	 sometimes	be	detrimental	 to	other	 groups	 of	 society	 such	 as	 the	workers.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	emphasis	on	workers	is	expected	to	have	an	effect	on	increasing	investment.	This	is	certainly	 different	 from	 the	 rulers	 in	 the	democratic	 system	 who	 seek	 to	 make	policies	 that	 favor	 their	 voters.	 So	 that	 it	is	expected	that	the	voter	community	can	provide	 input	 on	 policies	 made	 through	existing	representative	institutions.			From	the	description	above,	 it	can	actually	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 comparative	impact	 of	 democracy	 and	 authoritarian	models	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 have	 a	 direct	impact	 on	 economic	 development	 and	income	redistribution.	However,	 other	 scholars	 also	noted	 that	 democracy	 sometimes	engenders	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	mode	of	fiscal	and	social	policy.	A	change	in	the	governing	coalition	can	change	the	mode	 of	 fiscal	 and	 social	 policy	 adopted	by	 a	democracy.	This	 is	 clearly	 shown	 in	Germany	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 20th	 century	
when	 the	 progressive	 movement	successfully	 introduced	 public	participation	 in	 the	 state	 constitution.	Many	 saw	 that	 this	 effort	would	have	 an	impact	 on	 the	 institutions	 that	 lead	 to	socialism.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 the	experience	 of	 Germany	 which	 saw	 the	democratic	 voting	 model	 as	 being	considered	 to	 create	 financial	 policies,	such	 as	 tax	 laws,	 which	 were	 driven	 by	populist	 arguments	 and	 endangered	 the	public	 interest.	 (P.	 Feld,	 A.V.	 Fischer&	Kirchgassner,	2010).	Regarding	 the	 impact	 of	democracy	on	welfare,	Siegle	saw	that	the	progress	 of	 democracy	 gave	 rise	 to	 hope	for	 prosperity.	 The	 adoption	 of	 a	democratic	 regime	 is	 recognized	 as	having	 the	most	dynamic,	 innovative	and	productive	 economic	 conditions.	Economic	 stability	 occurs	 because	 of	 the	integrity	 of	 financial	 institutions	 that	support	 it	and	the	protection	of	property	rights	 that	 exist	 in	 democracy.	 This	condition	 has	 enabled	 countries	 to	implement	 democracy	 to	 improve	 and	maintain	 the	 improvement	 of	 their	people's	 quality	 of	 life	 for	 generations.	Siegle’s	 study	 also	 saw	 that	 citizens	 in	developing	 democracies	 had	 a	 life	expectancy	 of	 nine	 years	 longer,	 infant	mortality	 rates	 were	 20%	 lower	 and	secondary	school	participation	rates	were	40%	 higher	 than	 those	 in	 the	 countries	under	 the	 authoritarian	 regime.	 In	addition,	 democracies	 rarely	 allow	 their	economic	 conditions	 to	 reach	 the	 lowest	point	(Siegle,	2016:1-2).	The	explanation	above	shows	 that	democracy	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 creating	institutions	 that	 have	more	 integrity	 and	transparency.	 In	 this	 case	 the	strengthening	 of	 these	 institutions	 will	
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provide	 more	 conducive	 conditions	 to	support	 economic	 growth	 which	 will	ultimately	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 people's	welfare.	 Thus,	 strengthening	 democracy	is	 considered	 to	 provide	 strong	opportunities	 for	 the	 state	 to	 improve	economic	welfare.	The	openness	of	democracy	is	also	considered	 to	 have	 direct	 benefits	 for	economic	efficiency.	Greater	transparency	in	 the	 democratic	 regime	 is	 an	indispensable	 factor	 in	 controlling	corruption	 which	 is	 the	 biggest	 obstacle	to	development.	Democracy	is	considered	to	 be	 able	 to	 create	 a	 process	 of	structuring	 within	 the	 country	 on	 an	ongoing	 basis.	 For	 example,	 if	 a	 leader	fails	 to	 understand	 the	 direction	 of	 the	policy	 going	 forward,	 then	 the	 nature	 of	democracy	 will	 correct	 by	 encouraging	the	 replacement	 of	 leadership	 through	 a	set	of	new	assumptions	and	strategies.	In	this	case,	democracy	is	not	a	guarantee	to	make	 improvements	 in	 the	 management	of	 the	 country.	 However,	 they	 guarantee	the	right	to	make	changes	(Siegle,	2016:7-8).	 	The	 connection	 between	democracy	 and	 economic	 prosperity	 is	inseparable	 from	 the	 public	 attitude	towards	democracy	 itself.	 Public	 attitude	towards	 democracy	 is	 especially	important	 during	 the	 period	 of	democratic	 consolidation.	 Once	 the	democracy	 has	 been	 consolidated,	 public	attitude	 toward	 democracy	 might	 not	affect	 significantly	 the	 stability	 of	democracy.	However,	economic	condition	might	 determine	 the	 fate	 of	 democracy.	As	 long	 as	 economic	 prosperity	 is	 not	under	critical	situation,	democracy	can	be	preserved.	 This	 is	 evidence	 in	 South	Korea.	 The	 successful	 period	 of	
democratic	 consolidation,	 for	 example,	can	 help	 maintain	 the	 stability	 of	democracy	even	though	the	turmoil	of	the	1997	economic	crisis	has	eroded	the	level	of	 public	 trust	 towards	 democracy.	Though	 most	 people	 consider	 Korean	democracy	 is	 not	 effective	 enough	 in	facing	 economic	 challenge,	 Korean	democracy	successfully	weather	the	crisis	due	to	bright	history	of	economic	growth	(Kang,	2015).		 The	Korean	case	above	shows	that	the	success	of	a	country	 in	 implementing	democracy	 should	 be	 balanced	 by	 the	country's	 success	 in	 increasing	 economic	growth.	However,	this	success	still	 leaves	new	 problems	 such	 as	 economic	inequality.	 This	 economic	 imbalance	certainly	illustrates	how	a	democratically	successful	 country	 does	 not	 necessarily	provide	a	guarantee	of	the	distribution	of	economic	 growth	 in	 the	 country.	Thus,	 it	can	 be	 seen	 that	 a	 country	 that	 is	successful	 in	 implementing	 democracy	will	 always	 be	 tinged	 with	 economic	challenges	 related	 to	 equitable	 economic	growth.		 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 democracy	itself	can	help	push	for	economic	growth.	At	least	in	three	African	countries	starting	their	 democratization	 in	 the	 early	1990s—Benin	 (1990),	 Mali	 (1991),	 and	Madagascar	 (1991),	 all	 of	 them	 recorded	economic	 growth	 after	 embracing	democracy.	 In	 Benin,	 for	 example,	 the	average	per	capita	income	grew	from	0.28	percent	during	the	1980s	to	1.45	percent	after	 1991.	 In	 Madagascar,	 despite	 its	meager	 growth,	 the	 average	 GDP	 per	capita	 did	 increase	 from.	 an	 average	 of	 -1.87	percent	before	1991	to	-0.75	percent	after	 a	 decade	 of	 waves	 of	democratization.	 Finally,	 in	 Mali,	 per	
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capita	 GDP	 growth	 rose	 from	 an	 annual	average	 of	 -2.24	 percent	 in	 a	 decade	before	1991	to	2.5	percent	in	the	next	ten	years	(Rodrik	&	Wacziarg,	2005).		 It	is	seen	that	democratization	will	indeed	 produce	 benefits.	 However,	 a	study	conducted	by	Rodrik	found	that	the	wave	 of	 democratization	 experienced	 by	some	 countries	 could	 not	 necessarily	have	an	impact	on	the	impetus	for	growth	and	 a	 decrease	 in	 economic	 volatility	 in	the	 short	 term.	 However,	 the	 existing	empirical	 argument	 on	 the	 connection	between	 democracy	 and	 economic	growth	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 argue	 against	political	 reform	 in	 developing	 countries.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	economic	growth	in	several	countries	that	have	 followed	 democratization	 shows	that	 democratization	 can	 create	conducive	 conditions	 in	 the	 political	transition	 which	 will	 be	 expected	 to	increase	economic	growth.	However,	 economic	 growth	 can	also	 be	 achieved	 under	 authoritarian	regime.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Africa	 and	East	 Asia.	 In	 Africa,	 for	 example,	authoritarian	regimes	maintain	economic	growth	 using	 their	 neopatrimonial	structure	 with	 the	 support	 of	 micro-autocratic	 institutions.	 Meanwhile	 in	 the	case	 of	 East	 Asia,	 political	 elites	 use	 the	majoritarian-biased	 democratic	institutions.	 Empirically	 this	 contributes	to	economic	growth	(T.	Rock,	2013).		Thus,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 each	country	 will	 strive	 to	 increase	 economic	growth	 regardless	 of	 the	 system	 of	government	 they	 have.	 Both	 the	authoritarian	 and	 democratic	 systems	will	 create	 a	 separate	 policy	 model	 to	increase	 economic	 growth.	 Therefore,	 a	number	 of	 institutions	 were	 formed	 to	
help	 the	 government	 in	 realizing	 this.	Both	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 those	characterized	 by	 autocracy	 are	 built	 to	increase	economic	growth.	Regarding	 the	 impact	 of	democracy	 on	 policy,	 Switzerland	provides	 a	 good	 example	 on	 how	 the	direct	democracy	impacts	on	policy.	With	a	 clear	 federal	 structure,	 established	through	 direct	 democracy	 at	 all	 levels	(federal,	 state	 and	 local),	 all	 forms	 of	public	 expenditure	 must	 be	 taken	 into	account	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 logic	 of	 direct	democracy.	 The	 fiscal	 referendum	 is	designed	 to	 provide	 space	 for	 the	 public	to	 supervise	projects	 that	are	considered	very	 slow	 in	 their	 performance	 and	expenditures	 that	 exceed	 the	predetermined	 spending	 threshold.	 This,	for	 example,	 occurs	 in	 infrastructure	projects	 or	 the	 construction	 of	 public	facilities	 (P.	 Feld,	 A.V.	 Fischer	 &	Kirchgassner,	2010).	The	 role	 of	 the	 community	 in	economic	 development	 in	 a	 democratic	system	 is	 needed	 to	 supervise	 policies	and	 the	 realization	 of	 economic	development	 policies	 that	 have	 been	made.	 Through	 the	 representation	 of	democratic	 institutions,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	policies	 and	 their	 realization	 can	make	 a	positive	 contribution	 to	 the	 economic	development	of	society.			China	 provides	 an	 interesting	lesson	 how	 local	 political	 institutions	could	 advance	 economic	 growth	 and	economic	equality.	A	 study	 conducted	by	Shen	and	Yao	 (2008)	using	data	 from	48	villages	 from	 eight	 provinces	 in	 China	from	 1986-2002	 shows	 that	democratization	at	the	village	level,	in	the	form	of	local	election,	does	contribute	to	a	more	 equitable	 income	 distribution.	
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However,	 China’s	 democratic	 experiment	started	 in	 1987,	 culminated	 in	 The	 1998	
Organizational	Law	of	Village	Committees	(OLVC),	 exhibits	 otherwise.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	after	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 law	 that	income	inequality	rose	from	0,29	in	1987	to	0,35	in	2000	in	China’s	villages.		This	 study	 indicates	 that	 the	election	 introduced	 in	 China’s	 villages	works	under	what	Daron	Acemoglu	call	“a	weakly	 institutionalized	 governance”.	This	 occurs	 because	 there	 is	 no	 direct	election	 outside	 the	 villages.	 Democratic	process	 works	 under	 the	 authoritarian	mode	 adopted	 by	 Chinese	 government.	Thus,	 there	 is	 support	 system	 for	 the	democratization	under	way.	On	the	other	hand,	 election	 increases	 public	expenditure,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 increase	 net	income	 transfer	within	 the	 villages.	 	 The	positive	 role	 of	 election	 in	 reducing	income	 inequality	 does	 not	 come	 true.	Democracy	 does	 not	 help	 income	redistribution	 in	 China.	 Shen	 and	 Yao	(2008)	 study	 contribute	 to	 our	understanding	 on	 decentralization	 under	weakly	institutionalized	governance.		The	 case	 of	 China	 above	 shows	that	 democratization	 at	 the	 local	 level	which	is	not	followed	by	democratization	at	 the	 national	 level	 will	 have	 a	 sub-optimal	 effect.	 In	 this	 case,	 even	 though	democratization	at	the	local	level	is	going	well,	 this	 policy	 could	 clash	 with	 the	policy	 model	 adopted	 by	 the	 central	government.	 Therefore,	 the	 formation	 of	democratic	 institutions	 is	 characterized	as	a	weak	democratic	institution.	Singapore's	 experience	 in	improving	 economic	 prosperity	 is	 also	interesting	 to	 understand.	 Despite	 its	non-western	 democratic	 character,	Singapore	 facilitates	 popular	
representation,	 political	 equality	 and	majority	rule	except	in	terms	of	providing	adequate	 political	 space	 for	 opposition	parties.	 Popularly	 elected	 governments	have	 controlled	 freedom	 in	 civil	 society	but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 have	 produced	better	 material	 life	 for	 the	 population	(Caoili,	2005).	The	 study	 conducted	 by	 T.	 Meyer	(2016)	 shows	 that	 countries	with	 strong	welfare	 are	 developed	 under	 conditions	of	 civil	 and	 political	 liberties.	 However,	this	 condition	 cannot	 be	 applied	 in	 all	countries,	 such	 as	 India,	 Malaysia,	Mongolia,	 Korea	 and	 Vietnam.	 Especially	for	 countries	 with	 a	 legacy	 of	 socialism	such	 as	 Vietnam,	 Mongolia	 and	 China,	universalism	 remains	 a	 part	 of	 the	country's	 political	 and	 bureaucratic	culture.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 political	ideologies	 of	 the	 governments	 of	 Korea	and	 Malaysia	 enables	 them	 to	 use	 a	development	 approach	 to	 welfare,	 as	indicated	by	 the	government	using	social	policies	 to	 industrialize	 and	 develop	 the	economy	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Authoritarian	regimes	in	China,	Vietnam	or	Bhutan	still	find	 it	 difficult	 to	 accept	 democratic	reform	for	economic	benefits.	Meanwhile,	the	 development	 of	 economic	 and	political	liberalization	is	considered	likely	to	 pave	 the	 way	 for	 equitable	 welfare	creation,	 although	 it	 will	 not	 happen	quickly.	 Finally,	 economic	 opulence	 and	democratic	rights	do	not	necessarily	 lead	to	 social	 justice.	 The	 case	 of	 Europe	shows	 this.	 Though	 democracy	 gives	chances	 to	all	 to	participate	 in	 the	policy	process,	 this	 still	 depend	 on	 the	conditions	 of	 who	 governs,	 fights	 and	wins	the	participation.		Variations	 in	 empirical	 evidence	regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	
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democracy	 and	 welfare	 as	 stated	 above	shows	 that	 there	 are	 other	 variables	besides	 democracy	 that	 have	 a	 major	influence	on	a	country's	welfare	policy.	If	there	 is	 a	 variation	 in	 welfare	 spending	among	democracies,	it	is	very	likely	that	it	is	 not	 only	 the	 type	 of	 state	 regime	 that	causes	 this,	but	 there	are	other	variables	that	 work.	 Among	 the	 institutional	variables	 that	 we	 think	 influence	 the	efforts	of	democracies	to	provide	welfare	for	 their	 people	 are	 the	 system	 of	government	 (presidentialism	 versus	parliamentaryism)	and	 the	electoral	 rule.	Because	a	parliamentary	system	requires	high	 inter-party	 trust,	 especially	 in	forming	 coalitions	 between	 parties	(Persson	and	Tabellini	2003:	24),	parties	are	 required	 to	 develop	 policies	 that	 are	broadly	 oriented	 and	 accommodate	constituent	 interests	 as	 widely	 as	possible.	We	therefore	hypothesize	that:	
	
H1:	 democracies	 with	 a	 parliamentary	
system	 will	 tend	 to	 be	 welfare	 oriented	
compared	 to	 non-parliamentary	
democracies		 Electoral	 rules	 in	 democratic	countries	will	 also	 strongly	 influence	 the	orientation	 of	 the	 state	 towards	 the	welfare	 policy.	 As	we	 know,	 there	 are	 at	least	 two	 electoral	 systems	 known	 in	party	systems	(the	third	is	a	modification	of	 one	 of	 these	 systems),	 namely	majority/plurality	 and	 proportional	representation.	 These	 two	 electoral	systems	 will	 influence	 the	 policy	preferences	 of	 parties	 fighting	 in	 a	country	 (Persson	 and	 Tabellini	 2003).	According	 to	 Duverger's	 Law,	 to	 define	the	 majoritarian/plurality	 system	 will	tend	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 two-party	 system	
while	 PR	 will	 lead	 to	 multi-party	 (Riker	1994).	 Because	 the	winner-takes-all	 rule	applies	 in	 the	 plurality	 system,	 parties	will	 tend	to	concentrate	on	the	contested	districts—because	 they	 have	 certainly	won	 in	 their	 constituencies.	 In	 this	condition,	 the	 policy	 preferences	 of	 the	parties	will	be	more	oriented	to	the	needs	of	 the	 contested	 area.	 Thus,	 policy	preferences	 of	 parties	 in	 a	plurality/majority	 system	 will	 be	geographically-based	 and	 limited.	Conversely,	 because	 the	 election	 victory	in	 the	 PR	 system	 is	 determined	 by	 each	percentage	of	votes	that	can	be	obtained,	then	 the	 party	 policy	 preferences	 in	 the	PR	 system	 will	 be	 broader	 because	 the	voting	 concentration	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 a	particular	 area.	 Therefore,	 party’s	 policy	preferences	in	the	PR	system	will	be	more	oriented	 towards	 wider	 public	 interests.	Therefore:		
H2:	 Democratic	 countries	 with	
proportional	 representation	 electoral	
systems	have	a	higher	welfare	orientation	
than	 democratic	 countries	 with	 non-PR	
electoral	systems.	
	
Methods		 This	 study	 will	 observe	 the	relationship	 between	 welfare	 spending,	as	the	operationalization	of	the	concept	of	welfare	 policy,	 and	 a	 governmental	system;	 and	 electoral	 rule	 in	 32	democratic	 countries	 from	 1961-2015.	Due	 to	 the	 missing	 values	 in	 several	variables	 in	 the	 countries	 observed,	 the	total	 remaining	 observations	were	 1,063	country-years.	 Thus,	 due	 to	 the	 missing	values,	 the	 data	 experienced	 a	 shrinkage	of	almost	40	percent.	Most	of	the	data	are	obtained	 from	 comparative	 political	
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datasets	 from	 1960-2016	 (Armingeon	 et	al.,	2018).		 In	 this	 study,	 the	 dependent	variable	 is	 the	 proportion	 of	 total	 social	security	 transfers	 to	 the	GPD.	This	 social	security	 transfer	 includes	 social	assistance	 (social	 assistance	 grants)	 and	welfare	benefits	provided	by	 the	 state	 to	its	 people.	 The	 data	 come	 from	 OECD	National	 Account	 Statistics	 compiled	 in	the	 Database	 Comparative	 Political	Dataset,	 1960-2016	 (Armingeon	 et	 al.,	2018).	 The	 electoral	 system	 variable	 is	also	 a	 dummy	 where	 the	 value	 of	 1	represents	 the	 Proportional	Representation	system	and	the	value	of	0	represents	 non-PR.	 Data	 regarding	 these	two	systems	are	available	in	comparative	political	datasets.		 The	control	variables	used	are:	(1)	GDP	per	capita	of	a	country.	This	variable	is	 important	 as	 a	 control	 because	countries	with	high	average	income	levels	tend	 to	 allocate	 large	 social	 funds	 to	support	 the	welfare	 of	 their	 society.	 The	source	 of	 the	 data	 is	 the	 World	 Bank	(2018).	(2)	government	budget	deficits	as	a	proportion	to	its	GDP.	If	the	government	experiences	a	deficit,	 it	 is	very	 likely	that	the	 government	 limits	 its	 level	 of	expenditure	 to	 social	 programs.	 Data	source:	 OECD	 economic	 outlook	 (2018).	(3)	 the	 level	 of	 openness	 of	 a	 country.	This	variable	represents	the	proportion	of	a	 country's	 total	 international	 trade	(export	 +	 import)	 to	 GDP.	 Data	 source:	Correlates	of	War	Project	National	Trade	data	 version	 4.0	 (Barbieri	 and	 Keshk	2017).	(4)	the	proportion	of	state	debt	to	GDP.	 Countries	 with	 large	 national	 debt	will	 tend	 to	 reduce	 spending,	 including	spending	 on	 social	 programs.	 Data	source:	OECD	economic	outlook	2018.	(5)	
index	 of	 electoral	 fractionalization.	 This	index	 is	 measured	 by	 the	 formula	proposed	by	Rae	(1968):											𝑟𝑎𝑒_𝑒𝑙𝑒 = 1− 𝑣!!!!!! 				Where	 vi	 is	 the	 proportion	 of	 votes	 for	parties	 i	 and	 m	 is	 number	 of	 parties.	Countries	with	a	large	fractionalization	of	votes	 will	 tend	 to	 be	 public	 oriented	because	 they	 must	 accommodate	 the	interests	 of	 a	 large	 coalition	 so	 that	 the	proportion	 of	 welfare	 spending	 in	 these	countries	 will	 be	 greater.	 Data	 source:	2018	 Comparative	 Political	 Dataset.	 (6)	proportion	 of	 seats	 for	 social-democratic	and	 left	 parties	 in	 parliament.	 Generally,	social-democratic	and	 left-leaning	parties	are	 welfare	 oriented.	 Therefore,	 the	increase	 in	 their	 seats	 in	 parliament	will	also	 increase	 welfare	 spending.	 Data	source:	 2018	 Comparative	 Political	Dataset.	(7)	proportion	of	members	of	the	socialist	 party	 and	 left	 in	 the	 executive	cabinet.	 Just	 like	 the	 argument	 above,	greater	 number	 of	 representatives	 of	socialist/left	 groups	 in	 the	 government	will	 encourage	 more	 welfare	 spending.	Data	source:	comparative	political	dataset	for	 2018.	 In	 general,	 our	 economic	variables	are	lagged	for	one	year	to	avoid	the	 possibility	 of	 endogeneity	 in	 the	model.		 Because	the	unit	of	analysis	in	this	study	 is	 country-year,	 the	 data	 will	 be	analyzed	 using	 a	 panel	 data	 analysis	technique.	 In	 this	 analysis,	 we	 use	 a	generalized	least	square	(GLS)	model	that	allows	 us	 to	 correct	 violations	 of	homoskedasticity	 assumptions	 and	autocorrelation	in	panel	data.	It	should	be	borne	 in	 mind	 that	 an	 imbalance	 in	 the	number	 of	 year	 observations	 in	 each	country	 will	 cause	 the	 variance	 of	 the	
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error	 term	 of	 the	 country	 to	 be	 unequal	for	 all	 countries.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 the	potential	 for	 autocorrelation	 in	 the	dependent	 variable	 because	 the	proportion	 of	 current	 year's	 welfare	spending	will	be	greatly	influenced	by	the	proportion	of	the	previous	year.		
	
Results	and	Discussion		 As	 seen	 in	 table	 1,	 democracies	that	 have	 a	 system	 of	 parliamentary	governance	 and	 a	 proportional	representation	 system	 have	 a	 higher	average	 rate	 of	 welfare	 spending	compared	 with	 democracies	 adopt	 none	of	 the	 systems.	 In	 a	 democratic	 country	with	 a	 parliamentary	 system,	 the	proportion	of	welfare	spending	to	GDP	is	0.5	percentage	points	higher	compared	to	a	 democratic	 country	 with	 a	 non-parliamentary	 system.	Because	 the	mean	of	 the	 GDP	 of	 the	 32	 democracies	 from	1961	 to	 2015	 is	 around	 US$	 300	 billion,	this	 means	 that	 the	 parliamentary	democracies	spend	US$	1.5	billion	higher	
than	 non-parliamentary	 democracies	each	year	on	average.		Likewise,	 democratic	 countries	with	proportional	representation	systems	also	 have	 higher	 welfare	 spending	 (2.7	percentage	points)	compared	to	countries	with	 other	 systems	 (plurality	 and	modified	PR).	Each	year	democracies	with	PR	system	spend	more	than	US$	8	billion	higher	than	non-PR	democracies.		 Statistically,	 the	 results	 of	 the	estimation	 indicate	 a	 significant	relationship	 between	 welfare	 spending	and	 the	 type	 of	 governmental	 system	(parliamentary	 vs.	 other)	 and	 the	electoral	 system.	 As	 predicted,	 countries	with	 a	 parliamentary	 system	 are	 more	welfare-oriented	 because	 the	 welfare	policy	is	a	policy	that	has	a	broad	impact	and	 can	 reach	 the	 middle	 class	 which	 is	the	 largest	 pool	 of	 votes.	 Likewise,	countries	 with	 electoral	 proportional	representation	 systems	 also	 tend	 to	 be	welfare	 oriented	 because	 parties	 are	forced	to	follow	public	will	for	the	sake	of	voting	 in	 elections.	
Table	1:	Welfare	Spending	and	Party	System		 DV:	Social	Security	Transfer	(%	GDP)		 Coefficient	 Standard	Errors	
Main	Predictors:	 	 	Parliamentary	 0.459***	 (0.171)	PR	System	 2.761***	 (0.189)		
Controls:	 	 	GDP	per	capita	[t-1]	 0.0000381***	 (0.00000399)	Government	Deficit	[t-1]	 -0.183***	 (0.0185)	Economic	Opennes	[t-1]	 90121.6	 (70717.6)	Government	Debt	[t-1]	 0.0225***	 (0.00235)	Electoral	Fractionalization	[t-1]	 6.468***	 (0.990)	%	Cabinet	Post	Occupied	by	Soc-Dem/Left	Party	 0.0230***	 (0.00745)	%	Seats	of	Social-Democrat/Left	Party	 -0.0206	 (0.0136)	
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Constant	 2.995***	 (0.739)		Wald	Chi2	Prob	>	chi2	 822.6	0.000	 	N	 1063	 		 	 	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
• p	<	.1,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
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The	graph	above	also	shows	visually	that	 average	 welfare	 spending	 in	democratic	 countries	 with	 a	 system	 of	parliamentary	 government	 and	 electoral	proportional	 representation	 systems	 is	higher	than	other	democratic	countries.			 From	 a	 political	 point	 of	 view,	 the	other	 variables	 that	 significantly	 affect	welfare	orientation	in	democratic	countries	are	 electoral	 fractionalization	 and	 the	number	 of	 cabinet	 seats	 controlled	 by	 the	socialist	 /	 left	 party.	 As	 predicted,	 a	democratic	 country	 with	 high	 electoral	fractionalization	 tends	 to	 be	 welfare	oriented	 because	 democracies	 with	 highly	fragmented	 parties	 require	 inter-party	coalition	so	that	the	governing	coalition	has	to	 adopt	 the	 policy	 widely	 accepted	 by	constituents	 of	 coalition	 parties.	Statistically,	 each	 unit	 increase	 in	 the	electoral	 fractionalization	 index	 can	increase	 welfare	 spending	 by	 6.5	percentage	 points	 (or	 around	 US$	 19.5	billion).	The	same	is	true	of	the	percentage	of	 cabinet	 posts	 controlled	 by	 the	 leftist	socialist	 party.	 Because	 the	 left-socialist	party	 tends	 to	 support	 redistributive	 and	welfare-oriented	 policies,	 the	 stronger	their	position	 in	 the	executive,	 the	greater	the	amount	of	welfare	spending	that	will	be	allocated.	 Statistically,	 we	 find	 that	 every	percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	 cabinet	post/seat	 controlled	 by	 the	 leftist	 or	socialist	 party	 was	 able	 to	 push	 the	increase	 in	 welfare	 spending	 by	 0.02	percentage	 points	 (or	 around	 US$	 sixty	million).	 As	 predicted,	 the	 amount	 of	welfare	spending	will	be	greatly	influenced	by	 the	 economic	 conditions	 of	 a	 country.	The	 three	 economic	 variables	 that	 we	consider	very	important	and	influential	are	income	 per	 capita,	 the	 deficit	 of	 the	government	 budget	 and	 government	 debt.	
Per	capita	income	represents	the	economic	strength	 of	 a	 country.	 The	 greater	 the	income	per	 capita	 is	 expected,	 the	 greater	the	 allocation	 of	 welfare	 spending.	Statistically,	 we	 find	 that	 every	 dollar	increases	 in	 income	 per	 capita	 in	 a	democratic	 country,	 it	 is	 predicted	 that	there	 will	 be	 an	 increase	 in	 welfare	spending	 by	 0.00004	 percentage	 point.	Conversely,	the	budget	deficit	will	force	the	state	 to	 cut	 welfare	 spending	 so	 that	 the	relationship	between	the	two	variables	will	be	 negative.	 Statistically,	we	 also	 find	 that	every	 percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	proportion	 of	 the	 government's	 budget	deficit	 to	 GDP	 will	 decrease	 the	 welfare	spending	 proportion	 by	 .18	 percentage	points.	 Surprisingly,	 we	 also	 found	 that	each	 percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	proportion	of	government	debt	to	GDP	also	boosts	 the	proportion	of	welfare	 spending	by	 0.02	 percentage	 points.	 Although	 the	results	of	this	statistical	analysis	can	occur	as	a	result	of	analytical	errors,	substantive	investigations	 of	 this	 problem	 are	 very	much	in	need	in	future	research.	
	
Conclusion	
	 This	 study	 tries	 to	 see	 why	democracies	 are	 not	 always	 welfare	oriented.	 Empirical	 evidence	 shows	 that	there	 are	 substantial	 variations	 among	fellow	 democrats	 regarding	 their	preference	for	the	welfare	policy.	We	argue	that,	 rather	 than	 the	 type	 of	 regime	 that	influences	 the	 orientation	 of	 democratic	countries'	 welfare	 spending,	 it	 is	 the	government	 system	 that	 might	 influence	this	orientation	towards	the	welfare	policy.	Besides	 that,	 we	 also	 suspect	 that	 the	electoral	system	also	influences	the	welfare	policy,	 given	 that	 the	 electoral	 system	greatly	 influences	 policy	 preferences	 of	
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political	 parties.	 The	 statistical	 estimation	results	using	the	Generealized	Least	Square	estimator	for	the	data	panel	show	that	our	estimates	 are	 statistically	 proven.	 In	general,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 correlation	between	 welfare	 orientation	 with	 the	government	 and	 electoral	 systems	 in	democratic	countries.		
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